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Abstract
This article analyses how and towhat extent state regulation of civil society organisations (CSOs) have resulted in elitisation,
i.e., the process of obtaining elite status within and beyond civil society. This is studied in the context of emerging democ-
racy in Indonesia and shrinking civic space in Cambodia. Combining Bourdieu’s concepts of field and elite with strategic
action fields, the article uses data from interviews with civil society leaders. It finds different patterns. In Indonesia, eliti-
sation occurs through a process of CSO formalisation and bureaucratisation, with elites gaining legitimacy owing to their
formal offices. As a result, competition for formal positions intensifies: This is particularly notable among national CSO
leaders, who may shift their activities to the grassroots level to seek further empowerment and other capitals to legit-
imise their elite status, facilitate the rise of leaders in existing fields, and create pluralistic forms of elites. Regulations have
also resulted in the marginalisation of non-formal elites and shifted the locus of legitimacy from activism to formalism.
Meanwhile, in Cambodia, regulatory formalisation and bureaucratisation has not only reduced the space for elite compe-
tition and level of competitiveness, but also created ‘most dominant actors’ or ‘hyper-elites’ who are loyal to and support
the regime and its priorities while punishing those who do not. This has resulted in a monolithic form of elites.
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1. Introduction
This article investigates the implications of state regula-
tions regarding civil society organisations (CSOs) for the
process of elitisation, i.e., the process throughwhich CSO
leaders use their capital to attain status within and be-
yond civil society. This article aims to answer the ques-
tion of how and to what extent CSO regulations have re-
sulted in elitisation, taking Indonesia and Cambodia as
its case studies. Indonesia represents a regime that reg-
ulates the mechanisms through which CSOs access state
resources and participate in policy processes. Cambodia,
meanwhile, represents a case where state regulations
have only been implemented recently in an attempt to
increase oversight over CSOs, which first emerged (with
strong international backing) in 1993.
This article focuses on civil society elites, namely
CSO leaders who receive recognition within the civil so-
ciety field. This is important because elite studies have
focused primarily on non-CSO actors—especially soci-
ety (Migdal, 1988; Sidel, 2005), religious (Buehler, 2014),
state (Robison & Hadis, 2004) and party elites (Case,
1996)—while CSO studies have emphasised organisa-
tions (Weller, 2004), movement (Aspinall, 2005; Uhlin,
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1997) and values (Appe, Barragán, & Telch, 2017) rather
than activists or leaders themselves. Activists and or-
ganisations are often treated interchangeably, and some
studies even view activists as representing organisations
(Afiff & Rachman, 2019).
This article is built upon the findings of a collab-
orative research project during which several studies
were conducted in Indonesia and Cambodia. Three tech-
niques have been exercised to collect primary data: for-
mal interviews, informal conversations and participant
observation in formal meetings, events and daily ac-
tivities. We adopted a semi-structured interview tech-
nique, using guided conversations rather than a struc-
tured inquiry to allow ample opportunities for respon-
dents to provide their perspectives and convey their
understandings of their organisational roles as well as
their extra-organisational relations. Semi-structured in-
terviews were carried out with CSOs leaders and ac-
tivists. For the Cambodian case, we have decided to
pseudonymise the names of all interviewees, CSO lead-
ers and organisations (CSOs, NGOs, and political parties)
in order to guarantee their safety.
In Indonesia, field studies were conducted between
October 2018 and June 2019, with data also being col-
lected through focus group discussions involving nine
elites representing five important subfields: agrarian law,
human rights, religion, anti-corruption and youth. Data
were honed through in-depth interviewswith seven lead-
ers in the agrarian subfield, as well as a review of internal
and public documents.
In Cambodia, research was conducted between May
and December 2019 with six organisations, one of
which—Farmer Center, an organisationmade up of farm-
ers’ networks that has both policy influence and grass-
roots engagement—is discussed in this article. Semi-
structured interviews were carried out with organisa-
tions’ leaders, board members and management teams,
as representatives of local organisations. In total, the
fieldwork comprised of in-depth interviews in Khmer
with 14 people in Phnom Penh and 12 people in Kampot
Province and 12 people in Preah Vihear Province.
In Indonesia, the phenomenon of elitisation was ex-
ploredwithin the agrarian subfield using the experiences
of CSO leaders involvedwith the Consortium for Agrarian
Reform (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria), a consortium
of more than 150 CSOs at the national and local lev-
els. Aside from its national scope, the Consortium for
Agrarian Reform was also chosen because of its deep
roots in Indonesia, having been established by elites
from various CSOs.
In Cambodia, the Farmer Center was chosen as a
case study, representing agriculture as a subfield that
has been prioritised by the government. Established by
a French CSO, the Farmer Center was chosen because it
was the only CSO that was capable of transforming itself
from a foreign-sponsored organisation into a national
one. By 2014, it had provided direct assistance to about
160,000 families in 22 provinces. The Farmer Center fo-
cuses on sharing knowledge about agricultural innova-
tions with local farmers, farmer associations and young
entrepreneurs.
This article argues that state regulations have trans-
formed the process through which CSO leaders achieve
elite status. It no longer is based on performance
and individual activism; it is derived from legal sta-
tus. Understanding the experiences of Indonesia and
Cambodia is crucial, as regulations produce a dual pro-
cess of elitisation, simultaneously expanding and con-
tracting the spaces available for inter-elite competition.
The former produces elite pluralism, while the latter pro-
duces a monopoly of elites.
The article is organised into five parts: introduction,
analytical framework, state regulations and elitisation in
civil society in Indonesia and Cambodia and conclusion.
2. Field as Analytical Framework
This article draws on Bourdieu’s concept of field, which
is “a field of forces structurally determined by the state
of the relations of power among forms of power, or
different forms of capitals…among the holders of dif-
ferent forms of powers” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 264). As
they involve diverse forms of capital and competition be-
tween actors, fields represent structured arenas of con-
flict (Swartz, 1997).
In this article, the field is understood as consisting
of multiple levels. To ease discussion, this article identi-
fies these levels as follows. First, the field refers to state
society, civil society, economic society and political soci-
ety. Second, the subfield refers to the civil society sec-
tors in which actors accumulate capital and work indi-
vidually or collectively. Finally, the sub-subfield refers to
the CSOs in which different actors compete. Referring to
Bourdieu, links between these fields are complex, and in-
tersection is common (Wacquant, 1996, p. xi). Hence, as
a theory of power, Bourdieu offers a flexiblemeans of un-
derstanding how elites—leaders who have accumulated
more capital thanothers—are produced and reproduced,
as well as how they compete to accumulate capital and
gain recognition (Bourdieu, 1990).
Furthermore, through the lens of Strategic Action
Fields (SAF)—a concept derived from Bourdieu’s work—
the conscious activities of actors within the fields are
prioritised over the unconsciousness of binary perspec-
tives and structures. SAF looks more at actors’ subjec-
tive standing than objectivity in the field (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2011). The term ‘strategic action’ highlights
the dynamicity of the field, while still recognising its
structural aspects. As such, SAF offers a meso-level so-
cial order. An order where actors interact with knowl-
edge of one another under a set of common under-
standings about the purposes of the field, the relation-
ships in the field (including who has power and why)
and the field’s rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 2). As
SAF emphasises the need to consider collective actors—
organisations, social movements or even government
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systems—in addition to individual ones, it argues that
collective actions work in conjunction with individual
strategic actions to shape contestation and competition
(Laamanen & Skålén, 2015). As arenas of competition,
fields have relatively flexible boundaries. They may be
singular, or may be nested, and are characterised by ac-
tors’ (1) diffused understandings regarding the rules of
the field; and (2) ability to accumulate capital (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2011, pp. 3–6). Actors’ competitiveness is de-
termined by their ability to utilise their political capital.
SAF’s view of contestation is actually parallel with
Bourdieu’s classical explanation of dominant domina-
tors and dominated dominators (Wacquant, 1996); i.e.,
hyper-elites, as identified byMaclean and Harvey (2019).
The terms refer to inter-actors’ competition, where the
most dominant actor (dominant dominators) may be
present within a certain field, and consequently more
dominated actors (dominated dominators) may exist in
this field. According to Bourdieu, there are two types of
political capital: that acquired by individuals and that ac-
quired through delegation (Bourdieu & Robinson, 1985;
Kauppi, 2003). Individual political capital is produced
through either “slow accumulation…or action in a sit-
uation of institutional void and crisis,” reflecting the
Weberian idea of charismatic legitimacy.Meanwhile, the
political capital acquired through delegation is accumu-
lated through institutions (Kauppi, 2003, pp. 779–780).
Competition with these fields, subfields and sub-
subfields will be understood through a competition of
(1) the basis of elitisation, including formalisation, bu-
reaucratisation and reputation; (2) the character of com-
petition (i.e., the degree of openness); (3) level of com-
petitiveness (i.e., high or low); (4) elitisation (i.e., produc-
tion or stagnation of elites); and (5) elite formation (i.e.,
plural or monolithic).
3. State Regulation of Civil Society
This article aims to understand the situation through
which one field influences the dynamics of another. In
this case, we are focusing on the implications of state reg-
ulations on elitisation process.
The state is a stronger field than civil society, political
society and economic society. It is “a kind of grand social
organiser that constantly exercises a formative action of
durable dispositions…it imposes fundamental principles
of classification on everybody” (Kauppi, 2003, p. 781). As
such, the State has the capacity to influences the rules of
the game used by CSOs and other organisations.
Studies on the State, regulations and CSOs are not
new to social science. However, we have been unable
to find any articles that discuss the implications of state
regulations on CSOs’ elitisation processes. A study by
Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash (2014), for ex-
ample, focused on how the nature of regime affects
the way states regulate CSOs. They argued that macro-
institutional arrangements of representation crucially af-
fect national styles of CSO regulation (2014, p. 716). State
corporatists, who understand CSOs as obstacles to their
regime, tend to limit their freedoms. Eldridge (1996),
meanwhile, argued that the identification of Pancasila as
a singular ideology through State regulation was an in-
strument used by the Soeharto regime to control CSOs
in Indonesia. Conversely, pluralistic states that see CSOs
as ‘substitutes for formal communication channels’ em-
phasise collaborative governance networks, prioritising
policy priorities over organisational structures (Bassarab,
Clark, Santo,&Palmer, 2019, p. 32). A study by Lay (2017),
for instance, showed how Indonesia’s political reform
has created more democratic space for CSOs to engage
in policymaking.
A study by Antlöv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl (2006) em-
phasised the negative impacts of state regulations on
CSOs, where structural differentiation and functional
specialisation provides space for power abuse. Several
studies have emphasised the motivation of state regu-
lations. The State’s inclination to control CSOs through
tight administration is aimed to limit these organisa-
tions’ latitude, as in the case of Cambodia (McCarthy
& Un, 2017). The same logic applies to Jordan, where
state regulation has been used to preserve the depoliti-
cisation of women CSOs (Ferguson, 2017). Meanwhile,
in Ethiopia, control has been exercised through the
implementation of good governance principles, espe-
cially transparency and accountability (Yeshanew, 2012).
Another study demonstrated how, in the UK, regulations
have provided local NGOs with the political space to be-
come involved in policy implementation (Lewis, 2008).
Plakhotnikova and Kurbanova (2008) use Kyrgyzstan
to examine civil society transformation, state-building,
and its implications for CSO leaders. Initially, leaders
emerged spontaneously, impulsively and situationally
but became organised as civil society became increas-
ingly institutionalised actors. Since then, CSO activities
have been “primarily linked to a high level of profession-
alism, succession procedures, and institutional sustain-
ability” (p. 27), with educated individuals and women
becoming leaders and activists. Leadership is no longer
charismatic, but rather rational and legal.
Moving beyond existing studies on state regulation
of civil society, this article argues that state regulations
have led to the formalisation and bureaucratisation of
CSOs. Formalisation and bureaucratisation have two dif-
ferent implications. For emerging democracies such as
Indonesia, formalisation and bureaucratisation create
new spaces for inter-elite competition, thereby promot-
ing elite pluralism. This occurs when CSO elites orient
themselves towards creating new subfields and entering
said fields to maintain their elite status. Meanwhile, for
states with shrinking civic space such as Cambodia, for-
malisation and bureaucratisation can narrow and even
close spaces for inter-elite competition. Referring to the
arguments of Knoke (1993) and Hoffman-Lange (2018),
that elites may be identified through their position and
reputation, this article argues that the formalisation and
bureaucratisation of CSOs through state regulations can
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create new spaces for CSOs while simultaneously limit-
ing the availability of spaces in non-prioritised sectors
(see Figure 1).
3.1. The Indonesian Case
In Indonesia, the main instrument used to regulate
CSOs and mitigate foreign influences is the Civil Society
Organisation Law (Government of the Republic of
Indonesia, 1985), which was passed by the authoritarian
Soeharto regime (Detik, 2007; Eldridge, 1996). Since po-
litical reform in 1998, CSO activists have sought to trans-
form State control. These demands have been positively
received by post-reform regimes, and both CSOs and gov-
ernment agents have used legal instruments to ensure
access to state resources, guarantee freedom of associa-
tion and improve public participation.
This has been realised, for example, through the rat-
ification of Law No. 12 of 2011 (Government of the
Republic of Indonesia, 2011a), which requires the gen-
eral public to be involved in the drafting of all laws. This
has provided a legal means for civil society elites to be-
come involved in the policymaking process. Since the
passage of this law, CSO regulations have become in-
creasingly diverse and detailed. For example, since its
2013 and 2017 revisions, the Civil Society Organisation
Law (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013,
2017) has allowed CSOs to exist as associations, founda-
tions or without any legal status whatsoever. All CSOs,
however, are required to have their own institutional
structures and mechanisms.
Several further laws have regulated CSOs in more de-
tail. The Foundation Law (Government of the Republic
of Indonesia, 2001), for example, contained multiple ar-
ticles that deal specifically with the institutional struc-
ture of foundations and mechanisms for filling them.
Its replacement, Law No. 28 of 2004 (Government of
the Republic of Indonesia, 2004) created new stan-
dards for CSOs, and thus affected their ability to ac-
cess state resources and participate in policymaking
activities. Today, Indonesia has many similar sectoral
regulations; take, for example, Law No. 16 of 2011
(Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011b) re-
garding Legal Aid and the Presidential Regulation regard-
ing the Procurement of Public Goods and Services, both
of which regulate CSOs’ access to funding. Regulation of
the Minister of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged
Regions and Transmigration No. 4 of 2015 (Ministry of
Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and
Transmigration, 2015) regarding the Administration of
Village-Owned Enterprises was drafted in the same spirit,
enabling CSOs, community-based organisations (CBOs)
and donors to work in conjunction with village-owned
enterprises were approved by the village government
and formalised through a memorandum of understand-
ing. Under these regulations, which are intended to guar-
antee accountability and transparency, actors’ formal po-
sitions within CSOs have become important.
State Regulaon
Single elitePlural elite
Formalisaon and
bureaurasaon
Shrinking space for
elite compeon
Widening space for
elite compeon
Figure 1. State regulations and elitisation.
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The internal rules of the game that regulate elite cir-
culation in response to state regulations, which have al-
ways emphasised formal processes, have similar implica-
tions, insofar as actors’ formal position is a central com-
ponent of their legitimacy.
3.2. The Cambodian Case
The Cambodian government started to regulate the civil
society sector after it passed the Law on Associations
and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) in 2010
and implemented it in August 2015 (Royal Government
of Cambodia, 2015). The most frequently quoted justifi-
cation for LANGO relates to the government’s need to
prevent foreign terrorist organisations (Karen & Peter,
2015; Palatino, 2015) and to govern CSOs. According
to officials at the Ministry of Interior, while there are
thousands of NGOs operating in Cambodia, they are not
being overseen by state regulations—which is particu-
larly necessary as many organisations receive interna-
tional funding.
Civil society actors have feared three aspects of
LANGO’s implementation: (1) Stringent requirements for
registration as a legal entity to operate and receive fund-
ing, (2) regular reporting of activities and financial status
(including amount and sources of funds) and (3) a vague
provision that requires CSOs to be politically neutral
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015;
USAID, 2016). Registration is only a small part of LANGO.
Interviews with officials of the Ministry of Interior who
oversee the law’s implementation suggested that its
main aim is to create more transparency (particularly fi-
nancial transparency) and accountability amongst CSOs
who receive funding from international organisations
and foreign governments. Not only does the ministry
require activity and financial reports, but also bank ac-
count numbers, which enable the government to trace
the source and amount of funding CSOs receive. Using
such information, the government can potentially moni-
tor and selectively target specific activities based on their
leaders’ political orientation as well as their funders. An
additional concern from CSOs is the use of LANGO to
close down NGOs that are critical of the government.
LANGO has been adopted together with broader po-
litical changes. Some observers note that the law’s adop-
tion suggests a change in the government’s strategy to
deal with civil society; it no longer relies on harassment
and intimidation, but instead uses more complex mea-
sures to threaten the sector (Un, 2019). One important
aspect of this attempt to increase the regulation of CSOs
is directly related to the government’s claim that some
civil society leaders and activists worked with the opposi-
tion party (the Cambodia National Rescue Party) to top-
ple the government during and after the 2013 national
election (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation, 2018).
Cambodia’s civil society has entered a new era of un-
certainty, with civic space being increasingly dictated by
the State. This has affected elite production and circula-
tion in a number of significant ways, as will be illustrated
through a case study of Cambodia’s agriculture sector.
4. Elitisation in Civil Society
Civil society, as well as the subfields and sub-subfields it
contains, represents an arena for inter-elite competition
as a part of elitisation. This will be demonstrated herein
through the experiences of Indonesia and Cambodia
(see Table 1).
4.1. The Indonesian Case
In the 1970s, agrarian reform became a central discourse
in some notable universities in Indonesia. However, it
transformed into a more organised movement following
the establishment of the Consortium for Agrarian Reform
in 1994. Over the years, the Consortium for Agrarian
Reform has significantly influenced the establishment of
CSOs and the production of civil society elites.
Agrarian reform was postponed by the Soeharto
regime for 32 years because it was identified with
communism. Nonetheless, activists revived discourses
on agrarian reform in the early 1970s using the Agro-
Economic Survey, a government research institution
under the Department of Agriculture (Saluang, 2019).
G. Wiradi, a researcher-cum-activist who had been
involved in the drafting of the Basic Agrarian Law
(Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1960) un-
der President Sukarno, and Sajogyo, an academic who
concealed his activism with agricultural research and
programmes, were central in transforming agrarian re-
form from mere discourse into a subfield of civil society
(Saluang, 2019). As agrarian issues became more com-
plicated in the 1980s owing to the regime’s repressive
regulations, ideological activism (through student move-
ments and CSOs’ organisational engagement) became
Table 1. Comparison of the Indonesian and Cambodian cases.
Manner Indonesia Cambodia
Formalisation and Bureaucratisation High High
Space for elite competition Widening Shrinking
Level of competitiveness High Low
Elitisation Reproduction of elite Stagnation of elite production
Elite formation Pluralistic Monolithic
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more common, creating a triangle of intellectual-cum-
activists, CSO leaders and student activists.
This alliance was marked by the establishment of the
Consortium for Agrarian Reform—at the time an under-
ground movement—in 1994 during a meeting of dozens
of activists and intellectual elites from various CSOs (in-
terview, D. Bachriadi, June 24, 2019). Consortium for
Agrarian Reform represented the convergence of two
specific interests, i.e., the interest of intellectual cum-
activists to have agency and an outlet tomaterialise their
ideas and the interest of CSO leaders and student ac-
tivists to gain academic support for their movement.
In order to be recognised by the state as an organ-
isation, since the very beginning, the Consortium for
Agrarian Reform adapted its internal rules of the game
to government regulations that required clear structures
and forums for decision making as well as elite circu-
lation mechanisms. Owing to internal regulations, this
subfield promoted competition between formal civil so-
ciety elites.
The dynamics of inter-elite competition within the
Consortium for Agrarian Reform can be traced through
the positioning and circulation of elites within its formal
structure—its executive and legislative bodies, as well
as its Expert Assembly. Internal Consortium for Agrarian
Reform guidelines position the National Congress as a
forum and mechanism for circulating elites and making
decisions. Decision-making in the National Congress fol-
lows the principle of ‘one man, one vote.’ This does
not hold true for the Expert Assembly, which is used
by intellectuals and senior activists as a means of guid-
ing discourse. Positions in the Expert Assembly are filled
through appointment, while other bodies are populated
through competitive mechanisms.
In Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s early years, elite
competition was not particularly prominent. This can
be attributed to two main factors: (1) a relative lack of
elites at a time when the number of CSOs was mush-
rooming and (2) a clear basis for elitisation, with indi-
viduals’ elite status being derived from their activism, in-
dividual reputation, capacity to produce discourse and
experience. It is not surprising that, between the First
and Sixth National Congress, the leaders who occupied
formal structural positions were campus activists who
had been intensely involved in civil society movements
and who had consistently produced and disseminated in-
formation on agrarian reform. Consortium for Agrarian
Reform’s lack of leadership in its early years, at a time
when CSOs were mushrooming in number, meant that
not all of its founding activists were involved in its inter-
nal competitions. Nonetheless, Consortium for Agrarian
Reform has been treated as a collective property of CSO
leaders from various sub-subfields.
Later developments resulted in the transformation
of Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s elitisation process.
In the mid-2000s, as donor institutions increasingly em-
phasised managerial capacity, accountability and trans-
parency, technocratic capacity became an important cap-
ital (Oxfam, 2020). At the same time, the State became
an alternative source of funding and allowed CSOs to
become involved in policymaking processes; in return,
it expected certain technical standards to be met. This
shift can be seen in the experiences of D. Kartika, the
Secretary-General of Consortium for Agrarian Reform
(2016–2021). After the Sixth National Congress (2013),
when Kartika failed in her bid to become secretary-
general, she descended to the grassroots and established
legitimacy as an activist. Her appointment was also rein-
forced by the affirmative and inclusive policies imposed
by international donor institutions. Ultimately, having ac-
cumulated resources outside the organisation itself as
an activist, Kartika was made Secretary-General at the
Seventh National Congress, receiving the majority vote
(interview, D. Kartika, June 26, 2019). Her appointment
as secretary-general, thus, cannot be separated from her
ability to combine the diverse resources at her disposal.
Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s first two National
Congresses produced an organisational structure con-
sisting of a chairman, an implementation body and
a secretary-general. This structure was later simpli-
fied, consisting solely of the secretary-general and the
supporting structure. Consequently, inter-elite competi-
Civil Society
Field
Agrarian
State Field
Agricultural
Subfield
Agrarian Reform
Subfield KPA
others
Figure 2. Connections among field, subfield, and sub-subfield of Indonesia case.
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tion became fiercer and elites were required to com-
bine diverse resources to gain the support of National
Congress participants.
This staunch internal competition drove Consortium
for Agrarian Reform’s leaders to seek new ways to
persevere and be recognised as elites. They did this,
first, by establishing new sub-subfields. This could occur
through anticipatory measures, such as those used by
Faryadi, who established the Alliance of Agrarian Reform
Movements (Aliansi Gerakan Reforma Agraria) while still
serving as the Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s first
secretary-general. Although the Consortium for Agrarian
Reform intended this alliance to facilitate its creation
of its own CBOs (Faryadi, 2016; Tanisa, 2003), over
time it provided Faryadi with a sub-subfield in which
he could exert power even after leaving the Consortium
for Agrarian Reform. New sub-subfields could also be
created in reaction to particular phenomena. For ex-
ample, Zakaria, an intellectual-cum-activist who helped
establish the Consortium for Agrarian Reform, was ac-
tive outside the sub-subfield of the Consortium for
Agrarian Reform; today, he chairs the Association for
Village Renewal (Lingkar Pembaharuan Pedesaan dan
Agraria), a CSO he established in 2002 that focuses on
village and agrarian issues. He had also been involved
in the drafting of the 2016 Village Law, which enabled
CSOs and CBOs to become involved in village-level ac-
tivities. The Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s leaders
used this law to establish Villages for Agrarian Reform
(Desa Reforma Agraria), a grassroots project (interview,
D. Kartika, June 26, 2019). Bachriadi established the
Agrarian Resources Center in 2005, six years after fin-
ishing his term on the Implementation Body and shortly
after leaving the Expert Assembly, while Rachman and
other activists established the Sajogyo Institute for simi-
lar purposes in 2005.
The above phenomenon indicates the emergence
and spread of elites, as reflected in the mushrooming
of CSOs in recent decades. In 2001, Indonesia had only
429 active CSOs (PLOD, 2005); one decade later, it had at
least 2,293 (Scanlon & Alawiyah, 2015). This implies that
organisational elites have become increasingly common
and diverse. It means that inter-elite discrimination has
promoted the diversification of CSO elites. This, in turns,
has promoted checks and balances and has thus become
a crucial part of democracy.
Since Indonesia began its political reform in 1998,
Consortium for Agrarian Reform activists have been di-
vided into two blocs, signifying a collective contestation.
The first bloc views the State as enabling the realisation
of agrarian reform, being the arena in which political de-
cisions are made. The State is also important because
of its significant symbolic power (interview, D. Kartika,
June 26, 2019). The second bloc, meanwhile, argues that
seizing such “political opportunities” would violate their
principles as activists, who are expected to exist outside
the State in order to provide checks and balances. For ex-
ample, Bachriadi stated, “activists always talk about op-
portunities…but movements are characterised by their
ability to challenge [others]. Whether or not they have
an open structure, opportunities, they will still challenge
[others], as that is their driving principle” (interview,
D. Bachriadi, June 24, 2019). In the context of emerg-
ing democracies such as Indonesia, this reflects Etzioni-
Halevy’s (1993) argument that elite pluralism promotes
checks and balances.
Second, elites have migrated to other fields, par-
ticularly the State. For example, Setiawan became in-
volved in the State field while still serving as Consortium
for Agrarian Reform’s Secretary-General (2005–2009),
having been asked to join the National Land Agency
(Badan Pertanahan Nasional; interview, U. Setiawan,
June 26, 2019). He chaired the Food Security Council
at the Ministry of Agriculture before being asked to
handle agrarian reform at the Presidential Staff Office.
Other former Consortium for Agrarian Reform leaders
who migrated to the State field included Rachman—
better known as Oji—and Nurdin. A senior activist who
was greatly respected by the Consortium for Agrarian
Reform, Rachman, became part of President Jokowi’s in-
ner circle through his organisational network before ul-
timately working with the Jakarta Governor (interview,
U. Setiawan, June 26, 2019).
Rahman was the first former Consortium for
Agrarian Reform leader to join with Masduki (interview,
D. Bahriadi, June 24, 2019), a civil society leader who
helped found Indonesia Corruption Watch. Masduki had
served on the National Ombudsman Commission. In
2014, after a stint on Jokowi’s presidential campaign
team, he became the Director of the Presidential Staff
Office; today, he is Minister for Cooperatives and Small
and Medium Enterprises. Nurdin, who is currently Chair
of Consortium for Agrarian Reform’s National Council,
was also a member of the Presidential Staff Office.
Similar trajectories were followed by other Consortium
for Agrarian Reform leaders, including Wijayanto, who
is now part of a special commission of the Jakarta
Governor’s Office. CSO activists’ involvement in the State
and civil society fields does not only necessitate complex
networks amongst civil society elites, but also highlights
the strong overlap between these fields. These fields,
thus, are not sharply distinguished.
Third, elites established CBOs or remained ac-
tive at the local (grassroots) level. Zakaria (interview,
July 6, 2019) explained, “They don’t disappear…their
roles…become more diverse. Boy Fidro lived in a village,
built schools, became a teacher…a principal…in Garut,
Tasikmalaya, Ciamis.” This practice is also illustrated
by Agustiana, who represented the Pasundan Farmers’
Association (Serikat Petani Pasundan) during Consortium
for Agrarian Reform’s establishment but remained active
at the grassroots level (interview, D. Bachriadi, June 24,
2019; U. Setiawan, June 26, 2019). As such, local spaces
have been maintained by the Consortium for Agrarian
Reform elites, as these have provided them with a space
for retaining their elite status.
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4.2. The Cambodian Case
Unlike the Consortium for Agrarian Reform, which is
strongly characterised as a social movement, the agrar-
ian subfield in Cambodia has involved agriculture and ru-
ral development—both key government priorities since
the United Nations organised Cambodia’s first national
election in 1993 and the country became reintegrated
into the region and the world. The establishment of the
Farmer Center in 1997 followed international NGOs’ suc-
cessful implementation of agriculture and capacity de-
velopment during the 1990s. The formal establishment
of the Farmer Center also enabled the transfer of lead-
ership from foreigners to Cambodians, as well as the
transformation of international NGOs into Cambodian
CSOs. As a national player in the agriculture and rural
development field, the Farmer Center has become well-
respected, particularly for its ability to effectively provide
training and extension services and mobilise capacity
building for rural farmers and communities. The Farmer
Center has been led by formal elites, representing a di-
verse group of high-profile individuals working in the
civil society field and in large international organisations.
One of the most recognised leaders today, Mr. Som, is
known as a foreign-educated agriculture expert who in-
troduced new approaches to agriculture as he increas-
ingly accumulated social and cultural capital. His lead-
ership of one foreign CSO’s projects was followed by
his appointment as the Farmer Center’s first director in
2015. His success in obtaining donors’ financial support
and, through his personal networks within the Ministry
of Agriculture, government political support resulted in
the Farmer Center establishing close relations with rural
farmers and formalising farmer associations in the coun-
try. The Farmer Center has grown from seven employees
working in two villages in one commune in a province
to a staggering 277 employees serving 7,200 villages
in 1,050 (out of 1,640) communes in 22 of Cambodia’s
24 provinces. In 2012, Mr. Som received the Ramon
Magsaysay Award for his contribution to agriculture and
poverty reduction.
Increased regulations, in conjunctionwith rural popu-
lar support for the work of the Farmer Center, prompted
Mr. Som and his trusted network of NGO leaders to en-
ter the political field. He played an important role in cre-
ating new sub-subfields by establishing the New Party in
2015, which provided Mr. Som, other CSO leaders, and
farmer organisations an arena to explore opportunities
in the political field. Despite Som’s failed prime ministe-
rial candidacy in 2018, the New Party received five com-
mune council seats in four provinces. Given the num-
ber of seats contested (11,500) and area covered, these
results were insignificant; nonetheless, the New Party’s
showing is important within the context of Cambodia
and its elections (Morgenbesser, 2019). The election of
grassroots activists and organisational leaders such as
Mr. Oun to commune government further strengthened
his profile within farmer associations and Farmer Center.
Oun had become known as the president of the Farmer
Association and as amember of the Farmer Center Board,
having worked with donor agencies and gained popular-
ity among grassroots members. Oun’s ascendance from
ordinary farmer to local political and agricultural elite re-
flect Mr. Som’s and Farmer Center’s ambition when it ini-
tiated the grassroots mobilisation and capacity building
of rural farmers and their associations.
However, Som’s focus on politics since 2016 has re-
sulted in setbacks in Farmer Center’s agricultural activi-
ties. As he focused on developing his party and political
agenda, he left the CSO to new management. Mr. Som,
as the leader of Farmer Center, became the ‘most dom-
inant actor’ or ‘hyper-elite’ within the organisation’s hi-
erarchy owing to his loyalty to the regime and support
for state priorities; this resulted in the stagnation of the
elitisation process. Farmer Center’s director since 2017,
Malis, has thus experienced significant problems gain-
ing formal recognition, including difficulty in registering
the organisation’s new management with the Ministry
of the Interior and problems with human resources.
Many senior staff have left Farmer Center, while inter-
national donor support has diminished (interview, Malis,
May 2019).
Reflecting on Farmer Center’s case, CSO regulation
has had three major effects on elites in Cambodia. First,
it has pushed CSO elites to forge a closer relationship
with State elites, and this has taken place through in-
vestment in personal contacts. It has long been noted
that one positive development during the 2000s was
the localisation of leadership, with Cambodian nation-
als replacing foreigners in leadership positions (Öjendal
& Ou, 2015). This trend initially created opportunities to
strengthen trust between CSO and State elites, and—as
shown in the case study—enabled both to work closely.
In the case of the Farmer Center, the personal relation-
ship between Som and the Minister of Agriculture was
important to the Farmer Center’s success and enabled
it to effectively provide input. CSO elites have had to
move away from criticising the government to adopt-
ing a more engaging approach and assisting the govern-
ment in carrying out itsmission (seeHenke, 2011). Such a
phenomenon has also been seen in contemporary China,
where CSOs have sought to create a ‘win-win’ situation
(Fulda & Song, 2012).
Second, CSO regulation has significantly constrained
CSOs’ ability and institutional capacity to carry out their
mission, which has resulted in CSO elites moving to
other fields. In the case of Farmer Center, the leadership
team’s engagement in politics by establishing a new po-
litical party that mobilised public support on the premise
that CSOs are powerless and that drastic and large-scale
change requires political power. Farmer Center, mean-
while, has faced significant institutional challenges in its
relations with the government. This problem remained
unsolved when interviews were conducted in May 2019.
The organisation’s change of leadership had yet to be
recognised by the government, as its documentation
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Figure 3. Links between field, subfield, and sub-subfield, Cambodia case.
was not accepted. Farmer Center has thus informally
hired government officials to process this paperwork.
This situation threatened its contract with the Ministry
of Agriculture to provide training to farmers as well as
its contract with the Ministry of Commerce to provide a
special market for Farmer Center’s farmers.
Third, pressure on CSO elites does not only come
from the State, but also from international donors.
Development partners have pressured CSOs to work
within the narrow framework dictated by the govern-
ment. Froman international donor perspective, the law’s
implementation makes it difficult to provide funds to
leaders who are not favoured by the government for fear
of limited effectiveness. Donor funding for civil society
has steadily declined in recent years; in 2016, for exam-
ple, there was a 15% decrease in Official Development
Assistance (USAID, 2016). Donors have responded to
LANGO’s implementation by selecting civil society and
individual leaders that can work effectively on issues in
which the government is interested. This shift in strategy
is reflected in the political empowerment championedby
the Farmer Center, whose funding has been significantly
reduced due to its leadership’s involvement in party pol-
itics. This has further limited the Farmer Center’s ability
to mobilise grassroot support and implement its activi-
ties with rural farmers. Furthermore, the provincial de-
partment of agriculture has discriminated against farmer
organisations whose leaders are active in party politics;
such farmers have been directly excluded from capac-
ity building activities and faced distrust among commu-
nity members.
This case study suggests that the impact of govern-
ment regulations and dependence on foreign funding
is likely to reinforce State-preferred civil society elites
rather than local constituents, and to favour national
elites over local elites as well as leaders with formal
and technocratic knowledge over informal and politi-
cal activism. Furthermore, it is highly likely that CSO
elite must manage and combine different subfields in
order to maintain their influence and elite status (see
Figure 3).
5. Conclusion
The experiences of Indonesia and Cambodia show sim-
ilarities as well as distinctions in the effects of CSO
regulations. Both cases reveal the centrality of regu-
lations, where states impose their fundamental princi-
ples of classification by drafting and implementing reg-
ulations to transform the character of civil society—
including its fields, subfields, sub-subfields and elitisa-
tion processes. These cases also demonstrate that state
regulations can fundamentally transform the process
of elitisation through formalisation and bureaucratisa-
tion. Nonetheless, these two cases show a very differ-
ent path. In Indonesia, State regulations have directly
shifted the basis of legitimation, with formal institu-
tional positions being used to legitimise elites’ status.
Formalisation and bureaucratisation have occurred as
CSOs’ collective capital have been converted to activists’
individual capital, thereby intensifying contestation be-
tween elites. Elitisation occurs through formal mecha-
nisms and is driven by bureaucratic logic, which has also
promoted inter-elite discrimination as an integral part of
the elitisation process. As a result, remaining elites have
sought to find spaces wherein they can maintain their
elite status. However, this has not resulted in stagnation.
Rather, it has led to elite pluralism, providing a new basis
for further democratic consolidation.
Meanwhile, in Cambodia regulation has limited the
space available for contestation and created a monopoly
that has stagnated the elitisation process. The case of
Cambodia also shows that CSO regulation has signifi-
cantly constrained CSOs’ ability and institutional capac-
ity to carry out their mission. CSO elites have thusmoved
to other fields, resulting in CSOs experiencing significant
difficulty reproducing elites. Likewise, the effects of CSO
regulations in Cambodian have not been direct. Instead,
these regulations have been influenced by the political
judgment of the regime and by CSO elites’ ability to
demonstrate support or even become part of the regime.
Elites who have proven to be the most loyal to the
regime have enjoyed privileges, being given a red-carpet
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to attain elite status. The case of Cambodia also con-
firms that personal relationships, such as that between
Som and the Minister of Agriculture, were not only im-
portant to Farmer Center’s success and ability to effec-
tively provide input, but also explained the hyper-elite
status achieved by certain actors. Regulations, there-
fore, have been used both as coercive and persuasive
instruments—-as stick and carrot—-to uphold CSOs’ loy-
alty to the regime. This model echoes Indonesia’s author-
itarian past under Soeharto when regulations were used
to push CSO elites to establish closer relationships with
State elites by investing in personal contacts.
Both cases also show that regulations have further
implications. In Indonesia, on the one hand, they min-
imise activism’s ability to mobilise civil society. On the
other hand, they transform organisational processes
from arenas for elite contestation into arenas for con-
testing resources qua resources. Administration and or-
ganisation are thus important material and symbolic cap-
ital for elitisation. This differs from the Cambodian case,
where administration and organisation have functioned
as arenas for State control. These case studies high-
light the need to consider political contexts and regime
characteristics when discussing the elitisation processes
within CSOs.
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